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ARGUMENT 
Cross-Appellant Joel A. Flake, Trustee of the Almon J. Flake Family Trust (the 
"Trustee"), submits this Reply Brief in support of his cross-appeal. In the sections below, 
this Reply Brief addresses two (2) issues raised in the Brief of Cross-Appellee filed by 
Marian R. Flake ("Marian"), dated February 6,1999. However, before reaching the merits 
of those issues, some preliminary comments are in order. 
The Brief of Cross-Appellee is replete with dramatic statements that attempt 
to superimpose Marian's, or her counsel's, moral judgments about the administration of the 
Trust. It reads less like a legal brief and more like an impassioned essay. Such statements 
are inaccurate, irrelevant, and inappropriate for an appellate brief. The Trustee's 
administration of the Trust has been guided by his good faith interpretation of the Trust 
instruments and the Orders of the district court. 
Additionally, the Brief of Cross-Appellee contains numerous misstatements of 
the record. They are too many in number and too tenuous in nature to address them all in this 
Reply Brief. However, the Trustee briefly corrects two (2) of them. First, Marian has 
confused Phase I and Phase II of the trial. {See Brief of Cross-Appellee, fflf 8-10.) As 
reflected in the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated July 11, 2001, 
it was during Phase II that the trial court considered the interpretation of the 1998 and 1987 
Trust instruments, not Phase I. Because Marian offered no evidence during Phase II, the trial 
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court dismissed all of her claims except those set forth in paragraph 9 of the Conclusions of 
Law. (R. 1155-57, 1160-61.)1 
Second, the Brief of Cross-Appellee makes several allegations to the effect that 
the Trustee and his siblings want to leave Marian "destitute." Although such allegations are 
both argumentative and irrelevant, they are nevertheless inaccurate. The Trustee has 
complied with every provision of the Restatement, and the trial court so found. The 
arguments boil down to Marian's contention that the provisions of the 1987 Trust 
Agreement, rather than the Restatement, govern the administration of the Trust. The facts 
and law relevant to that issue were fully set forth in the Trustee's earlier Brief and are not 
repeated here. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO FINDINGS OF FACT IN FEBRUARY 2000. 
Marian argues that the trial court made "verbal findings of fact" about the 
intent of Almon J. Flake ("Almon") during a hearing held February 10,2000. The supposed 
findings of fact, set forth at pages 11-12 in the Brief of Cross-Appellee, are simply gratuitous 
observations made by the District Judge as a preliminary statement to his findings about the 
amount of temporary support to be awarded. Almon's intent was not at issue in the hearing, 
only whether Marian was entitled to temporary support and, if so, the appropriate amount. 
\See Addendum I to Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, dated January 7,2002.) 
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The trial court expressly reserved ruling on which trust instrument controlled, the only issue 
that could have involved a determination of Almon's intent, and simply awarded temporary 
support until a trial could be held. (See Brief of Cross-Appellee, 12-13.) 
Significantly, the Order Re: Temporary Support entered February 24, 2000,2 
which was entered as a result of the hearing in question, and which was prepared by Marian's 
counsel, mentions nothing about the supposed finding. Certainly, if the trial court's 
observation had been intended as a true finding, Marian's counsel would have ensured that 
the written Order memorialized it. Following trial, the court entered detailed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law which explicitly held that the Court's Order Re: Temporary 
Support was thereby terminated. (R. 1160) The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
do not incorporate any supposed findings made at the February 2000 hearing, and Marian did 
not object to them on that basis. 
The Trial Judge's statement quoted in the Brief of Cross-Appellee, therefore, 
was not intended as a finding of fact and was not meant to be binding upon any party. It was 
simply a personal observation about how he believed Almon might have responded to 
Marian's claim. 
Finally, even if the Trial Judge did intend his statement to be binding upon the 
parties at that time, his later Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law superceded the 
2Since the Brief of Cross-Appellee fails to include the Order, a copy is contained as 
an Addendum to this Brief. 
3 
statement for the reasons stated above, and this Court should reject Cross-Appellee's 
argument in its entirety. 
POINT II 
PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE ADMINISTRATION OF A 
TRUST ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS. 
In the Brief of Cross-Appellee, Marian first misstates the Trustee's position, 
and then argues that his position is against public policy. She argues no authority for that 
conclusion, and none exists. For those reasons, this Court should reject the argument 
entirely. 
Marian argues that the "expressed purpose of the Contesting Children has been 
to cut Marian off completely. Completing their design the Contesting Children left Marian 
without any support, arguably taking to themselves more than $800,000.00 in the process." 
(Brief of Cross-Appellee, p. 21.)3 
The statement is flatly incorrect. As the trial court found, and as Marian cannot 
deny, the Trustee has rendered to Marian every provision accorded to her under the 
Restatement. Accordingly, Marian has the use of the Flake family home at no cost, with 
most utilities paid, and also was provided an automobile. All of this is in addition to the 
3
 Marian's Counsel continually uses the inappropriate term "Contesting Children." 
Aside from its inaccuracy, the term is argumentative and intended as an epithet. The trial 
court disallowed the use of the term upon the objection of the Trustee's counsel. This Court 
should do the same. 
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other assets, income, and family support she already possesses or to which she has access. 
Because the Trustee believes the 1987 Trust Agreement was folly superceded by the 
Restatement, he did not provide Marian with any benefits to which she might have been 
entitled under that document. Marian's argument is also incorrect because there has never 
been any evidence to support her speculative claim that the Trust estate is worth more than 
$800,000.00. The Trustee's detailed accounting to the trial court directly contradicts the 
claim, and Marian has never objected to it. 
It is noteworthy that Marian cites no legal authority for her claim that the 
Trustee's administration of the Trust is against public policy. Marian challenges some of the 
cases cited in the Brief of Cross-Appellant, on other issues, and then tries to extrapolate from 
editorial board comments published with the Uniform Probate Code to support her argument. 
(See Brief of Cross-Appellee, pp. 20-24). None of those authorities suggest that Almon 
could not execute the Restatement, amending and fully superceding the 1987 Trust 
Agreement, and thereby limit his provision for Marian. The Trustee is aware of no authority 
for such a proposition. Indeed, the argument would potentially undermine thousands of 
private trust agreements based upon the highly subjective interpretation of the term 
"destitute." 
In several instances this Court has addressed the application of public policy 
to the enforcement of contracts. In Nielsen v. O 'Reilly, et al, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992), the 
Utah Supreme Court upheld a judgment which denied the plaintiff s recovery of prejudgment 
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interest from an insurance company in excess of policy limits. The plaintiff claimed that as 
a matter of public policy the prejudgment interest should be awarded. In its ruling this Court 
stated as follows: "we reiterate the public policy requirement that absent legislative direction 
to the contrary, contract provisions are to be enforced as written." Id. at 670. Thus, it is a 
general rule of law that private contracts will not be disturbed unless there is some contrary 
public policy, perhaps based upon a legislative declaration. 
In certain areas of the law, this Court has set public policy limits on the 
enforcement of contracts. For example, on grounds of public policy, parties to a contract 
generally may not exempt a seller of a product from strict tort liability for physical harm to 
a user or consumer. Interwest Construction v. Palmer, et al, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 
1996). The Court has also has indicated that it does not favor contracts purporting to limit 
other kinds of tort liability, and may sometimes declare them invalid as against public policy. 
DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Company, 663 P.2d 433, 437 (Utah 1983). The Utah Court of 
Appeals has held that on the ground of public policy the law will not permit a contract 
protecting a person against his own fraud. Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging 
Specialists, Inc., etal, 937 P.2d 1274,1280 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotingZamZ> v. Bangart, 
525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974)). The Court of Appeals has also held that in some 
circumstances pre-nuptial agreements may be contrary to public policy. Neilson v. Neilson, 
780 P.2d 1264, 1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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The Trustee's research, however, reveals no case or statutory authority for the 
notion that public policy limits a person's right to dispose of his estate by inter vivos trust, 
even if that disposition limits what a survivor otherwise might be entitled to receive. For 
those reasons, the Court should reject Marian's public policy argument in its entirety. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reject the arguments set forth 
in the Brief of Cross-Appellee and should rule in accordance with the facts and law set forth 
in the Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant. 
DATED this j? day of March, 2002. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK 
Attorneys for Trustee and 
Personal Representative 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on this <r day of March, 2002, to the following: 
Loren D. Martin, Esq. 
MARTIN & NELSON, P.C. 
136 East South Temple, #400 





MARTIN & NELSON 
A Professional Corporation 
Loren D.Martin (2101) 
Mail: PO Box 11590 
Street: 139 East on South Temple, Suite 400 
Sale Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
800 W. State Street, Farrr.lr.ctcr., Utah 8^025 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ALMON J. FLAKE, 
deceased. 
: ORDER 
Re: Temporary Support 
Probate No: 99-37-00264 
Judge: Jon M. Memmott 
This came before the Court for hearing on the issue of Temporary Support on Thursday, 
Februarv- 10, 2000. Present were: Joel Flake, Trustee, and his counsel, D. Bruce Oliver. Marian 
Flake was present with her counsel, Loren D. Martin. Others were also present. Witnesses were 
sworn and testimony was taken. The Court, giving careful scrutiny to this matter, being 
sufficiently advised, it is HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Joel Flake, the present trustee of The Almon J. Flake Trust shall pay to 
Marian Flake $1,000.00 per month until further order of this Court. 
2. Payments shall commence for the month of February, 2000. 
3. Payments shall be delivered to Marian to arrive at her residence for the month of 
Februarv* and shall be delivered and arrive at the residence of Marian Flake no later than 5:00 P M 
1 :1 }Mi Jea J&P 
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on or prior to the expiration of the last day of the month every month thereafter until further 
ordered. 
DATED this <S&~"3ay of February, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
m.flwJg-
JON M. MEMMOTT 
District Judge 
Approved as to form & Content: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Counsel for Joel Flake, Trustee 
2 
